There is a large econometric literature that examines the economic assimilation of immigrants in the United States and elsewhere. On the whole immigrants are seen as atomistic individuals assimilating in a largely anonymous labour market, a view that runs counter to the spirit of the equally large literature on ethnic groups. Here we argue that immigrants assimilate as communities, not just as individuals. The longer the immigrant community has been established the better adjusted it is to the host society and the more the host society comes to accept that ethnic group. Thus economic outcomes for immigrants should depend not just on their own characteristics, but also on the legacy of past immigration from the same country. In this paper we test this hypothesis using data from a 5 percent sample of the 1980, 1990 and 2000 US censuses. We find that history matters in immigrant assimilation: the stronger is the tradition of immigration from a given source country, the better the economic outcomes for new immigrants from that source.
Introduction
Studies of immigrant assimilation have proliferated in the last three decades. This literature has focused on how rapidly after arrival (and to what extent) the earnings of immigrants catch up with those of natives. The ensuing debate has focused on cohort effects, on language acquisition and on assimilation in other economic dimensions. But for the most part, immigrant assimilation is viewed as individualistic rather than community based. Not surprisingly other social scientists look askance at what seems a rather narrow view taken by economists of the assimilation experience. Meanwhile a large literature (mainly by non-economists) has developed that sees immigrants as communities, not merely as individuals. 1 This implies that the assimilation experience of particular ethnic origin groups must be viewed as just that: the assimilation of groups, rather than of individuals who happen to be part of such groups.
In recent years economists have paid more attention to the role of the ethnic communities in conditioning patterns of assimilation among individuals within that group. These studies have examined the effects of ethnic concentration and immigrant ghettos on the economic outcomes of immigrants through processes such as the acquisition of language skills and mobility across occupations and localities. But this still treats the ethnic community itself as a given. A better approach is to regard the assimilation process as a two-way street. Assimilation depends not only on how immigrants fit into the host country's labour market and its wider culture, but also on the degree to which the non-immigrant community accepts, accommodates and adapts to particular immigrant groups. If we adopt this view then history matters: the more established is the tradition of immigration from a particular source, the more integrated that ethnic community will be, and the more easily new immigrants from that source will assimilate into the host labour market.
In this paper we explore the evidence that history matters. The following sections provide a brief survey of the relevant literature and an outline of the changing relationship between the origins of immigrants and their performance in the labour market. We then turn to examining whether the earnings of current immigrants are positively influenced by the history of immigration from the same source region. We find that-holding constant an immigrant's own characteristics-these immigration traditions do indeed have positive effects on immigrant earnings when analysed both at the national level and at the regional level. Finally we examine some other indicators of the social acceptance of immigrants from different source regions, including intermarriage and opinion surveys. The evidence seems to suggest that immigrants from traditional sources have higher approval ratings. We conclude that the melting pot still works-but it works at the community level and with considerable historical lags.
Individual and group assimilation
The analysis of earnings and other economic outcomes for immigrants that was pioneered by Chiswick (1978) largely sees assimilation as a process of individual improvement in a largely anonymous labour market. The individual's earnings are a function of his/her education and other relevant human capital variables including the number of years since arrival in the host country. The effect of years since migration reflects the individual's adaptation and to the host country labour market through the acquisition of relevant skills and experience. More recent studies start from the premise that because the foreign-born have characteristics and skills that differ from those of the host community there are potential gains from trade (Lazear 2000) , but these differences can also act as barriers to communication and hence to trade. Chiswick and Miller (2002) argue that the larger is the ethnic group, the greater is the supply and hence the lower is the price of 'ethnic goods'. Using city-level data, Cortes (2006) finds some evidence that unskilled immigration reduces the prices of immigrant-intensive goods and services.
Hence the larger is the ethnic concentration in a particular locality the worse will be the labour market outcomes of immigrants in that community. In areas where there are relatively few co-ethnics the price of ethnic goods will be higher and an individual has a greater incentive to invest in reducing the barriers, for example through language acquisition.
However, there are a variety of other possible effects on individuals' earnings arising from ethnic concentration. One is that there may be economies of scale or network effects in the production of ethnic goods and hence incomes might be higher where there are greater agglomerations of co-ethnics. Similarly, if there is discrimination against immigrants in the wider community either in jobs or in housing then individuals will gain by staying within their ethnic communities. On the other hand ethnic communities may involve crowding externalities, negative peer group effects, and reduced opportunities for profitable trade. Hence the effects of ethnic concentrations on immigrant outcomes could go either way and the results may differ across ethnic groups and with the characteristics of the individual immigrant.
2
Studies have also shown the there is persistence across the generations in the labour market performance of immigrants and their children. Borjas (1992) finds that that the income, education and occupational prestige of second-generation immigrants are inherited partly from their parents and partly, as an ethnic capital externality, from the ethnic group as a whole. The results suggest that there is considerable persistence in performance from one generation to the next, much of it arising from the transmission of ethnic capital. Hence "ethnic capital effectively lowers the flame under the melting pot from a full boil to a slow simmer" (Borjas, 1999b, p. 14) . This ethnic capital effect might be equally important for first generation immigrants: the higher the ethnic capital of a particular origin group, the better the performance of new immigrants from that origin. In a recent study of Mexican immigrants, Munshi (2003) shows that a network of longerestablished immigrants increases the employment probability for new immigrants.
These are significant advances that take the study of immigrant assimilation beyond the simple individualistic approach. But they still fail to capture the interaction between immigrant communities or ethnic groups and the host society. Such notions have been taken more seriously in the recent sociological literature on immigration which has moved beyond the so-called assimilationist approach, focusing more on "the process of interaction between host society institutions and structures and the characteristics of newcomers." "While the assimilation perspective portrayed American society as a rather amorphous, homogenous entity, an absorbent sponge, the newer theories gave shape to 2 A number of studies have addressed the endogeneity issue that arises from migration across localities.
Those that choose to migrate away from the ghetto may have superior characteristics and hence the measured effect of ethnic concentration may be partly due to self-selection. For various treatments of this issue see for example, Bertrand et al. (2000) , Borjas (2005) , Cutler and Glaeser (1997) , Cutler et al. (2005) , Edin et al. (2003) .
this amorphous entity. They pointed out that the sponge is structured and that structure itself is subject to change" (Schmitter Heisler, 2000, p. 79) .
Since the pioneering work of Glazer and Moynihan (1963) and Gordon (1964) sociological research has focused on how immigrants from different origin countries and regions have evolved into distinct ethnic groups. These studies have increasingly brought the host society into the picture, focusing on the degree of receptivity towards immigrants at a number of levels. These include government policy, civil society and individual attitudes, all of which are seen as culturally conditioned. One implication is that the outcomes for new immigrants depend largely on the degree of integration of the community as a whole and not just on the skills and motivation of the individual immigrant and the connections of his or her immediate friends and relatives.
Much of the emphasis in the sociological literature has been placed on the strategies of ethnic communities, stretching back to opportunities that faced them when they first arrived (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996) . This is seen in terms of immigrants' access to different sectors and different occupational strata. As one study puts it "in a raceconscious society such as ours, entire groups of people are ordered in terms of desirability for preferred jobs, with skill-relevant characteristics as additional weights" (Waldinger 1996, p. 18). As a result, the early arrivals from a given source tend to be highly concentrated in certain occupational niches or in specific lines of small business-often related to particular ethnic goods. Thus in New York, Chinese immigrants were initially concentrated in laundries, restaurants and the garment sector. Over time the second generation immigrants and their newly arrived co-ethnics diversified into a wider range of occupations, partly through the extension of ethnic networks, partly though the adaptation of the communities themselves to the norms of the host society, and partly because they became less exceptional in the eyes of the host population. According to the US immigration Commission of 1911 the new immigration "was largely a movement of unskilled labouring men who have come, in large part temporarily, from the less progressive and advanced countries of Europe" and that, on the whole, they were "far less intelligent" and were "actuated by different ideals" than the old immigrants. In addition, they "have almost entirely avoided agricultural pursuits, and in the cities and industrial communities have congregated together in sections apart from native Americans and older immigrants to such an extent that assimilation has been slow as compared to that of earlier non-English speaking races" (US Immigration Commission, 1911, Vol. 1, p. 14; see also Jenks and Lauck, 1926) .
These views and those of other observers say as much about the prevailing attitudes towards these new and unfamiliar immigrants as they do about the immigrants themselves. Such attitudes added to the new immigrants' disadvantage relative to immigrants from more traditional sources. As one observer puts it:
Northwestern European migrants arriving after 1880 enjoyed certain advantages over [Southern, Central and Eastern Europeans] arriving at the same time because relatively few of the early settlers in the United States were of Southeastern European origin. Due to the previous waves from Northwestern Europe, later migrants from these sources found relatives and townspeople who had arrived earlier and were in a position to offer some help; a generally more favourable attitude on the part of the earlier settlers; the availability of ethnic institutions that provided services ranging from medical to recreational; and added employment opportunities available from established ethnic compatriots. Hence the fact that many of the native whites were of the same ethnic origin as later immigrants from Northwestern Europe meant a generally easier situation for these immigrants around the turn of the century (Lieberson, 1980, p. 26/7) .
By the time the Immigration Commission reported, communities like the Italians and the Eastern European Jews had some thirty years of accumulated experience in the United States. Their growing social and economic integration is stressed in numerous accounts by social historians (Barton, 1975; Kessner, 1977; Bodnar, 1985) . According to these accounts an important part of the process was individuals moving up the occupational ladder. But that process was also facilitated by the adaptation of these ethnic groups as communities and by a growing familiarity with, and acceptance of, them by native-born Americans. Econometric analysis (some of which uses the Immigration Commission's own data) shows that the new immigrants suffered a substantial initial earnings disadvantage but they assimilated fairly rapidly towards the earnings levels of the native-born (Hatton 2000 , Minns 2000 ).
In the years before the First World War new immigrant communities expanded.
On the one hand they became better integrated and more widely accepted, but on the other hand inflows grew rapidly, embracing a widening range of source countries. Those The effects of these trends on the stock of immigrants can be seen at a more disaggregated level in Table 1 . This changing composition was accompanied by a gradual increase in the volume of the inflow from 2.5 million in the 1950s to 9 million in the 1990s, which raised the foreign-born share to 11 percent of the population in 2000 from 6.9 percent in 1950 and from only 4.7 percent in 1970.
The new immigrants of the late 20 th century shared many of the characteristics of the previous wave: they came from unfamiliar places, with unfamiliar languages and customs, and they were received with circumspection by the host community. Echoing the critics of immigration a century earlier Huntington has argued that American national identity is in a state of crisis because the latest waves are failing to assimilate:
[S]ustained high-level immigration retards and can even obstruct assimilation. … the decline in the immigration of Irish and Germans after the Civil War and the drastic reduction in immigration of southern and eastern Europeans after 1924 facilitated their assimilation into American society. If current levels of immigration are sustained, no such transfer of loyalties, convictions, and identities can be expected with Mexican immigrants, and the great American assimilation success story of the past will not necessarily be duplicated for Mexicans. (2004, p. 229) Like the earlier wave, the new immigrants of the late 20 th century came from much poorer countries with lower average skills and education. In the 1950s the average immigrant came from a country with a GDP per capita income 49 percent that of the US, whereas in the 1990s the average immigrant came from a country with a GDP per capita only 22 percent that of the US (Hatton and Williamson, 2006, p. 27) . Just as in the late 19th century, these trends were accompanied by a decline in the labour market performance of immigrants relative to the native born.
3 Borjas (1999a Borjas ( , p. 1724 found that while immigrant males earned 4.1 percent more than native-born men in 1960, they earned 16.3 percent less in 1990. Some of this was due to the decline in immigrant educational attainment, but when this effect is eliminated, the adjusted relative wage still fell by 13.3 percentage points over these thirty years.
These general findings are replicated in Table 2 Table 1 against the past stock of immigrants from that source divided by the current stock, for the three census years from 1980 to 2000. Here the past stock is the average number born in the source region as a share of the total population in the previous ten censuses, stretching back to the middle of the nineteenth century. The relationship is upward sloping although it is not a very good fit. The origin groups with long histories, including those that were the new immigrants of the late nineteenth century, have a rather better earnings performance than those with short histories. For those with relatively short histories but with much larger recent numbers, the relative wage is low. But such comparisons are crude and to see if history really matters we need to analyse the data more formally.
An model of immigrant earnings
Here we set out a simple model of demand for and supply of ethnic goods (or, alternatively, ethnic labour). We define the supply of ethnic goods, or direct labour services, for ethnic origin group g as:
where P g can be thought of as the relative price of goods and services of a given quality supplied by ethnic origin group g to the rest of the community, M g is the share of labour force represented by group g and μ g is a group-specific component. The demand for the goods or services of ethnic origin group g is: 
Following the standard earnings function, the log wage of the individual immigrant of education type i from ethnic group g depends on that individual's characteristics as well as on the valuation of the services of the ethnic group as a whole. 
The wage gap between immigrants and natives in a given education group should be a positive function of the immigrant's years since migration (γ 2 > 0) and of years since migration for the group as a whole (γ 3 β 2 /(α+β 1 ) > 0). It should be a negative function of the total number of immigrants from the ethnic origin group (γ 3 /(α+β 1 ) > 0) and a positive function of the familiarity of the native population with that particular ethnic group (γ 3 β 3 /(α+β 1 ) > 0). There are both group-specific and individual-specific error terms.
Estimates of earnings and hours from the US Census
We use the 5 percent US census samples for 1980, 1990 and 2000 in order to estimate equations for annual hours and earnings for males. 5 The estimating equation is:
We define variables for the 'pseudo-person' as the mean for a given education group (i) by age group (j) by ethnicity group (g) at each census (t). There are four education groups, eight age groups and 16 different origin-regions (see Appendix for definitions).
The left hand side of the equation is the ratio of an outcome variable for immigrants from a given origin (g) relative to that for native-born workers (n) of the same education/age group in the same year. Y ijgt is the pseudo-person's years since migration and Y gt is the average years since migration for other individuals in same origin group (i.e. excluding those in the same age-education cell). M gt is the total number of foreign-born from the origin-region at time t, as a proportion of the total population. The variable Z gt is our measure of the historical presence of an origin group. For this we calculate the average number of foreign-born from the origin-region enumerated in previous censuses stretching back 120 years. This is a measure of how embedded in American society are the traditions of immigrants from each origin-region.
The measure of immigration history could also capture the fact that early immigrants came from countries that were (and still are) relatively developed. Thus we also include in U gt origin region characteristics that influence the selection and performance of immigrants in the US. We include the ratio of GDP per capita in the origin region to the US lagged 10 years and the ratio of average years of education in the origin region relative to the US lagged 10 years (the 10 year lag aims to capture the conditions in the migrant's home country at the time he migrated to the US). Higher source region GDP for a given level of education reflects specific skills and technology in the source population that are not fully reflected in average education and that appear as higher unobserved labour market quality. Since the relevant variable is productivity net of education, we expect a positive sign on the GDP per capita ratio and a negative sign on the education years ratio. The selection process of immigrants from a given origin has been analysed using the Roy model (Borjas 1987 (Borjas , 1999a ; the greater the return to skill in the source country relative to the destination country, the more immigrants will be negatively selected. We proxy the relative return to skill by the ratio of origin-region inequality to US inequality, and we expect the sign to be negative. Selection is also likely to be more positive the higher are migration costs, and we attempt to capture this effect by the log of the distance between Chicago and the most important city in the origin region. Sources of these data are detailed in the Appendix. Finally, we also include dummies d i , d j , d t for education group, age group and year, although these are not reported in the tables of results. Given that most of the variation in the origin-specific variables Z gt and U gt is in the cross section we do not include origin fixed effects.
The results of this basic specification are shown in Table 3 . In the first column the outcome variable is the log ratio of annual earnings. The number of years since migration and its square give positive and negative coefficients respectively, consistent with the results from studies of individual-level data. The second and third columns show that years since migration has smaller and weaker effects for hourly wages and for hours worked. By contrast the coefficient on origin-specific average years since migration is not significant. This suggests that ethnic capital or network effects are not captured by the current duration of the ethnic community. Origin-region characteristics turn out to be important in all three regressions. The coefficients on the foreign to US GDP ratio are positive and those on the education ratio are negative as expected. This strongly supports the view that high origin income relative to education captures source-specific labour market quality. The ratio of the average gini coefficient in the origin-region relative to that of the US takes a negative coefficient, consistent with the predictions of the Roy model. The effect of distance turns out to be unimportant in the presence of these other origin-region variables.
As predicted, the current stock of immigrants has a negative impact on relative annual earnings, due to the crowding effect. But we also find that this effect is nonlinear-becoming less negative at higher levels of the origin-specific immigrant stock.
Most important for our purposes is the average stock of immigrants from the originregion over the previous 120 years. 6 This is a measure of the extent to which the past history of origin-specific immigration matters. Following the argument above that past history matters less for the most highly educated immigrants, we also include an interaction of the past immigrant stock with a dummy for the high education group (those with 4 or more years of college). For annual earnings and hourly wages the main effect is strongly positive while the interaction effect is negative with a slightly smaller coefficient for annual earnings. This supports the view that past immigration history matters far less for highly educated immigrants because they are more able to transcend ethnic barriers. 
Alternative estimates
Here we examine two variants of the estimates in Table 3 in order to check the robustness of the results. Because the variables representing the past history of immigration and other origin-specific variables have relatively little time series variation, Table 3 did not include origin-specific effects. Thus the immigrant stock effects may be capturing unobserved immigrant qualities that happen to be correlated with the timing and magnitude of past migrations but are not fully captured by origin-region variables like GDP per capita or education. Estimates of annual earnings and hourly wages using GLS random effects and fixed effects regressions are presented in Table 4 . 7 A Hausman test indicates that random effects is not rejected against fixed effects at the 5 percent level for relative annual earnings and at the 10 percent level for relative hourly wages.
The main difference in these results as compared with those in Table 3 is that the origin-region characteristics become statistically insignificant. Origin specific effects absorb the effects that were previously captured by the GDP ratio, the education years ratio and the gini coefficient ratio. By contrast the immigrant stock effects are relatively robust-indeed the coefficients of the current immigrant stock and its square are substantially larger. The past stock effects are little altered in magnitude although they are reduced in significance as might be expected, as most of the variation is across origin regions rather than over time. We conclude that the effect of the past immigrant stock is not simply a spurious result arising from the omission of origin-region fixed effects.
A second question is whether it is immigration in the recent past or in the distant past that influences the earnings assimilation of current immigrants. Table 3 these regressions do not include origin-specific effects. The first equation includes the immigrant stock 120 years previous to the current census (thus for immigrants observed in 1980 the past stock is that in 1860). This produces a positive coefficient that is highly significant while the interaction with high education is negative but much smaller. The coefficients on the stock 70 years ago in the second column and on the stock 30 years ago in the third column follow a similar pattern. It is notable that the main effect increases in 7 Since distance varies only by origin-region it is eliminated from these regressions.
size as the past stock becomes closer to the present, but the offsetting effect of high education becomes even greater. Thus recent immigration history is more important than that of the distant past, especially for immigrants with less than college education. For example Mexicans were 1.0 percent of the population in 1980 and 3.2 percent in 2000.
Over that period the increase in the current stock reduced Mexican earnings by 4.1 percent while the past stock (30 years ago) increased relative earnings by only 0.6 percent. Out-of-sample projections suggest that the past stock effect will become much stronger in the future; between 2000 and 2020 the past stock (30 years earlier) should raise Mexican earnings by 9.8 percent.
An alternative measure of the degree of familiarity with certain ethnic origins is the proportion claiming ancestry from a particular source region. This is based on the first ancestry that was listed, and the base population is the native-born aged 15 and over who listed at least one country of ancestry. However, claiming certain ancestries is a choice that may depend on the individual's income or labour market status and we therefore instrument the ancestry variable using the past stock measure that appeared in Tables 3 and 4. The result in the last column of Table 5 shows that the main effect gives a highly significant positive coefficient for annual earnings while the interaction largely offsets this effect for the highly educated. This result provides further support for the idea that immigration traditions matter for the economic outcomes of current immigrants. To give an idea of the magnitudes, shifting from the proportion who claim British ancestry to the proportion who claim Mexican ancestry would reduce the relative annual earnings of an immigrant group in 1990 by about 13 percent.
Analysis by census division in the United States.
The concentration of immigrants both past and present varies widely across different parts of the United States. For example, in 1990 Mexicans were 68 per thousand of the population in the Pacific division but they were less than one per thousand of New
England's population; by contrast the figures for immigrants from southern Europe were 4 per thousand in the Pacific division and 18 per thousand in New England. Thus the labour market outcomes for an immigrant may depend on current and past immigrant concentrations in their particular location, but these effects will not necessarily be the same as those estimated at the national level. If the performance of immigrants is shaped by attitudes and norms that are formed at the national level then estimates across US regions will not fully reflect these national effects.
Here we follow the same approach as previously, but we disaggregate the data into the nine census divisions that represent broad geographic regions in the US. 8 The estimating equation is re-written (with subscript r for US census division) as:
Thus, allowing for missing cases, we have more than eight times as many observations and we include fixed effects for US division and immigrant origin. The dependent variables and years since migration now vary across the four education groups (i), eight age groups (j), nine census divisions (r), 16 origin groups (g), and three census years (t).
The immigrant stock variables and group years since migration vary across division, origin and year; and the distance variable is now calculated separately for each division.
This approach has advantages and disadvantages over the national-level data used previously. The advantage is that we can exploit geographic variation in the concentration of immigrants from different origins. One disadvantage is possible endogeneity due to migration across census divisions, an issue that has been raised in the context of measuring the effect of immigration on native wages (Borjas 2003) . We minimise this problem by estimating across census divisions rather than across states or cities, thus reducing the cross border effect.
9 Division-level analysis also avoids too much reduction in the cell sizes when calculating the current and past immigrant stocks. But, as noted Note that if immigrants' location decisions depend on their relative wage then the endogeneity relates principally to the current immigrant stock, M, rather than to the past stock, Z, which can be reasonably assumed to be exogenous. While Z might be a natural instrument for M, we cannot use it here because it appears directly in the structural equation.
above, if there is a national component to effects of current and past immigrant stocks then these will not be captured by division-level analysis.
The first two columns in Table 6 include dummies for origin-region and exclude variables that have no variation across US census divisions. Not surprisingly, the effects of years since migration and its square and origin-group average years since migration are similar to those in Tables 3 and 4 . But the current and past stock effects are much smaller.
For annual earnings the main effect of the past immigrant stock is one third the size of that in Table 3 , and the interaction with high education is reduced by about half. This difference in the coefficients could arise either because the immigrant stock coefficients are biased upwards in the absence of origin region fixed effects, or it could be because division-level variables do not capture national-level effects. In order to investigate this, the third and fourth columns of Table 6 include the GDP per capita ratio, the education years ratio and the gini coefficient ratio but exclude the origin-region dummies. These additional variables give coefficients that are very similar in magnitude to those in the national-level regression in Table 3 . But the coefficients on the current and past immigrant stock variables are very little changed in this alternative specification, as compared with the first two columns. We therefore conclude that there is a distinct difference between the immigrant stock effects at the national-and division-levels, which is not simply due to the presence or absence of origin-region fixed effects.
The immigrant stock variables now explain less of the annual earnings difference in 1990 between immigrants from Mexico and those from the UK. Using the weighted means across divisions, the current stock effect lowers Mexican earnings relative to the British and Irish by 1.6 percent and the past stock effect lowers them by a further 3.8
percent. More appropriately, we can examine the spatial differences. For Mexicans in 1990, relative earnings are predicted to be 5.4 percent lower in the Pacific division than in the Mid-Atlantic due to the current stock effect but 3.2 percent higher due to the past stock effect. For other groups that are more evenly distributed, the interregional effects are smaller. For Southern Europeans, between the Pacific and the Mid Atlantic, the current stock effect is +1.7 percent while the past stock effect is -1.7 percent; for the British and Irish these effects are +0.1 percent and -1.4 percent respectively. Table 7 shows the effect of different measures of past immigration history. Again the coefficients on the past immigrant stock and its interaction with high education are considerably smaller than in the comparable regressions in Table 5 . This reinforces the conclusion that to some degree the receptiveness to different immigrant groups by originregion operates at the national level rather than at the local or regional level within the US. In the first three columns the coefficients on the main effect of the past immigrant stock remains fairly stable as the past stock becomes closer to the present, but as in the national level estimates, the interaction effect becomes larger the more recent the immigrant stock. Finally the ancestry variable, which is instrumented as before, gives a coefficient that is very similar to that in the national-level estimates of Table 5 .
Immigrant integration and host country attitudes
The evidence for earnings suggests that-relative to non-immigrant Americansimmigrants from origin-regions that have a long immigration history do better in the labour market than those with shorter histories but larger current numbers. The interpretation that we have given to this is that these immigrants are more readily accepted because their cultures are more familiar and have, to some degree, become part of the mainstream culture. But does this really reflect the degree of integration of different ethnic communities or is it simply the result of other unobserved characteristics that happen to be correlated with immigration histories? In this section we briefly review other indicators of the degree of integration and acceptance of immigrants by origin.
Intermarriage between immigrants and native-born Americans has often been regarded as a key indicator of social integration (Kalmijn, 1998) . 10 Thus "intermarriage across racial or ethnic lines is considered a litmus test of assimilation because it affirms the dissolving of cultural barriers to the formation of intimate relationships between members of socially or culturally distinct groups" (Bean and Stevens, 2003, p. 175) . Table 8 lists the proportion of married immigrants aged 20-39 in 1980 who were married to a native-born American and who married after arrival in the US. 11 As others have noted the rate of intermarriage is much higher among 'old' than among 'new' immigrant groups (Lieberson and Waters, 1990) . The correlation across these origin groups between the ratio of the average past stock to current stock, displayed in the third column, and the rate of intermarriage is 0.80.
Intermarriage rates are consistent with the idea that immigrants with a long tradition behind them are more readily accepted because their cultures are more familiar and have, to some degree, become part of the mainstream culture. But it could nevertheless be argued that immigrants from non-traditional sources are simply less willing to intermarry, because of greater cultural distance or differences in religious beliefs. Thus the evidence from intermarriage may reflect the preferences of immigrants rather than those of the host society. 12 One measure of immigrants' social assimilation, which does not rely on the cooperation of others, is the proportion who take out citizenship. The second column of Table 8 shows the proportion of the same base group who had become citizens. This has a much lower correlation (0.30) with the ratio of past stock to present stock. It suggests that intermarriage largely reflects the preferences of natives rather than those of immigrants, but this is at best a very indirect inference. immigrants from a given source had on balance been a good thing or a bad thing for the United States and the figure reported in Table 9 is the difference between the numbers who responded 'good' and the number who responded 'bad' as a percentage of all respondents. 13 Thus, for example, 53 percent of respondents thought that Polish immigrants had on balance, been 'good' while 12 percent thought they had been 'bad', with the remainder responding either 'mixed feelings' or 'don't know'. Evidence such as that in Table 9 is largely circumstantial, and it could reflect a host of things other than the degree to which Americans are willing to trust, do business with, employ, or engage in other ways with different immigrant groups. And there remains the doubt that these rankings are conditioned largely on racial stereotypes rather than being a reflection of immigration traditions. In 1997 a Knight-Ridder survey on attitudes towards immigrants asked questions specifically about recent immigrants (meaning those arriving since 1980). Respondents were asked for opinions towards different origin groups on a scale of one (very unfavourable) to 10 (very favourable). The results in the first column of Table 10 indicate that while European immigrants were the most favourably regarded, others such as Africans and Japanese also scored highly, and the differences across groups were relatively small. The second column reports on a scale of one to 10 the respondent's perception of the way that these groups are portrayed in the media. This gives a somewhat wider range with a ranking a little more similar to that in the previous table. One interpretation of these results is that while individuals see themselves as relatively unbiased, they see society as a whole as rather more unfavourable to groups such as Mexicans and Cubans who scored low in the polls reported in Table 9 .
One reason for thinking this is reported in the third column of Table 10 .
Respondents were asked if they had friends who were recent immigrants from up to three of the origin groups listed. They were also asked if immigrants from up to three origin groups were living nearby. The third column of Table 9 reports the ratio of the number who replied that they had friends from a particular origin divided by the number that reported having neighbours from that origin. This can be interpreted as the number of close contacts divided by the opportunity for such contacts. This ratio is much lower for Mexico, Cuba, India and China than for Africa, Europe the Middle East and other
Caribbean. While the ranking does not correspond particularly closely with the past to present immigrant stock ratio in the final column, neither does it correspond very closely with the column on favourable or unfavourable opinion. Thus while Americans do not seem to be particularly prejudiced against some origin groups relative to others, there are distinct differences in the degree to which they interact with these different groups.
Conclusion
The earliest accounts of immigrant assimilation argued that America was a Although the relative earnings of immigrants to the US have fallen since the 1960s, this is largely because of the shift in the composition towards immigrants from origin regions with little past history. As the surge of new immigrants has continued, the ratio of past stock to current stock has been increasing for most origin regions. This has contributed to the rise in the relative earnings of immigrants when the source region composition is held constant. 14 On the one hand this suggests that the melting pot still works: as the new immigrants of recent years accumulate longer histories their outcomes will continue to improve. On the other hand our results suggest that the assimilation process may take rather a long time.
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